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WrrNEsSBs-CoMPBTENCB OF DBFBNDANr's SPousB As WrrNEss POR THB

PnosECUTION-Defendant, on trial for the offense of transporting across state
lines a sum of money exceeding $5,000 feloniously obtained by fraud, was con-
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victed largely through the testimony of his victim. The fraud charged consisted
of a lightning courtship and hasty marriage, closely followed by the disappearance
of the new husband along with the entire estate of the too-gullible bride. Over the
objection of the defendant, his wife was permitted to testify to the swindle practiced upon her. After conviction, he £led a motion for a new trial, contending
that it was error to permit a wife to testify against her husband in a criminal
prosecution where the essence of the offense charged was the felonious taking of
her property. Held, the testimony was admissible in evidence, the common law
rule being now outmoded in the light of reason and experience. United States v.
Graham, (D.C. Mich. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 237.
Under the common law, this ruling would undoubtedly have been held erroneous, as that law regarded neither spouse as a competent witness in criminal pro- ·
ceedings against the other, except where the offense charged involved actual
violence to the person of the would-be witness.1 The :i;easons behind this rule are
usually considered to be the common law doctrine of unity of husband and wife,
a fear that permitting the wife to be the instrument of her husband's detection and
punishment would stir up strife between them with resultant destruction of the
sacred marital relationship, and a mistaken view of litigation as a kind of game
requiring a sportsmanlike attitude on the part of the law.2 The exception arises out
of necessity, as absolute enforcement of the rule would leave the weaker spouse
entirely at the mercy of the stronger. This disqualification persists in most states
in the form of a statute preclµding testimony except in prosecutions "for a crime
committed by the one against the other." Such statutes have been variously
interpreted, most courts holding them to be merely declaratory of the common
law.3 However, the result of disqualifying what would often be the most important witness in a prosecution after all hope of marital harmony had been destroyed
has led some courts to a more liberal construction. Probably the most widely
adopted expansion is that permitting the spouse to testify in cases of sexual
offenses committed with a third person. 4 Some cases indicate that the test is
18 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2239 (19_40). See also·Lord Audley's Case, 123 Eng~
Rep. 1140 (1631); Meadev. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 775, 43 S.E. (2d) 858 (1947) .
•2 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2228 (1940), criticizing the rule as outmoded and
illogical; 5 BENTHAM, R.AnoNALB oF JUDICIAL ·EVIDENCE, Bk. IX, c. V, §IV (1827), describing the rule a century ago as one sprung from feudal barbarism which seeks to convert evecy
man's house into a den of thieves and a nursery of unpunishable crimes; Cargill v. State, 25
Okla. Cr. 314, 220 P. 64 (1923); Jenkins v. State, 191 Ark. 625, 87 S.W. (2d) 78 (1935).
3 Meade v. Commonwealth, supra, note l; Grier v. State, 158 Ga. 321, 123 S.E. 210
(1924). Many states provide specific statutory exceptions to the common law rule; others
provide similarly that the spouse is competent but not compellable. See 2 WxcMoRE, EvxDENCE, 3d ed., §488 (1940) for a general survey of statutory provisions relating to qualifications of witnesses.
4 Lord v. State,. 17 Neb. 526, 23 N.W. 507 (1885) (adultecy); Wilkinson v. People,
86 Colo. 406, 282 P. 257 (1929) (rape); State v. Chambers, 87 Iowa 1, 53 N.W. 1090
(1893) (incest); Schell v. People, 65 Colo. 116, 173 P. 1141 (1918) (bigamy)." Contra:
State v. Lasher, 131 l\ilinn. 97, 154 N.W. 735 (1915) (adultecy); State v. Goff, 64 S.D. 80,
274 N.W. 665 (1936) (rape); Toth v. State, 141 Neb. 448, 3 N.W. (2d) 899 (1942)
(incest). The strength of this minority probably comes from the feeling expressed in United
Statesv. B~sett; 5 Utah 131 at 136, 13 P. 237 (1887): "Aman in the bed of a strange woman
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whether the marital relationship constitutes an element of the crime charged.5
Other courts have extended the statutory exception to those cases in which the
.would-be witness is injured directly as an individual, rather than only as a member of society in general. 6 The most notable contribution of the federal courts in
this field to date has been the ruling that "a woman is as much entitled to protection against complete degradation as against a simple assault," followed in a long
line of Mann Act cases.7 But the basis for the holding in the instant case is to be
found in the memorable opinion of Justice Sutherland in Funk v. United States,
in which the Court, declaring that "the public policy of one generation may not,
u~der changed conditions, be the public policy of another," laid down the rule
that the COJ,llpetence of witnesses in the federal courts was to be governed by
common law principles as interpreted and applied-in the light of reason and
experience.8 This holding is now embodied in Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 9 In view of the changed economic and social conditions since
the birth of the common law rule,10 the recognized difficulties imposed on the
law enforcement agencies, and the doubtful effect of the law of evidence on marital concord, 'it would seem that the "light of reason and experience" should disclose the propriety of extending protection at least to the wife's property, even if
not to third parties.11 The decision in the principal case seems all the more proper
under the recent declaration of the Supreme Court that "rules of evidence for
criminal trials in the federal courts are made a part of living law and not treated
as a mere collection of wooden rules in a game."12
William R. Worth, S.Ed.
is in a very unfavorable situation to insist upon preserving inviolate the sacred concord of
marriage, and harmony and confidence on the part of his wife." Unfortunately, this did not
persuade the United States Supreme Court, which reversed the decision. Bassett v. United
States, 137 U.S. 496, 11 S.Ct. 165 (1890).
·
5 State v. Burt, 17 S.D. 7, 94 N.W. 409 (1903); State v. Chambers, supra, note 4;
Toth v. State, supra, note 4.
6 Emerick v. People, 110 Colo. 572, 136 P. (2d) 668 (1943); State v. Woodrow; 58
W.Va. 527, 52 S.E. 545 (1905); Dill v. People, 19 Colo. 469 (1894).
7 Denning v. United States, (C.C.A. 5th, 1918) 247 F. 463 at 466; United States v.
Mitchell, (C.C.A. 2d, 1943) 137 F. (2d) 1006, adhered to 138 F. (2d) 831 (1943), cert.
den. 321 U.S. 794, 64 S.Ct. 785 (1944), rehearing den. 322 U.S, 768, 64 S.Ct. 1052
(1944); Shores v. United States, (8th Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 838.
s 290 U.S. 371 at 381, 54 S.Ct. 371 (1933).
9 18 U.S.C.A., fol. §687 (1927 to date).
10 See Hutchins and Slesinger, "Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Family
Relations," 13 MINN. L. R:Ev. 675 (1929).
11 One federal court has held that the wife's testimony may be received against her husband in a criminal case of any nature. Yoder v. United States, (C.C.A. 10th, 1935) 80 F.
(2d) 665. Contra: Brunner v. United States, (C.C.A. 6th, 1948) 168 F. (2d) 281; United
States v. Walker, (2d Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 564 (appeal pending). Among state courts,
only Colorado has held that its general exception includes injuries to property. Emerick v.
People, supra, note 6.
12 United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 at 66, 64 S.Ct. 896 (1944).

